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WHAT FEDERALISM TELLS US ABOUT
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Carol M. Rose
This Article discusses a niche within a niche: Federalism considerations in
theories of governmental takings of property. Several property and land use
theorists have argued that larger-scale and smaller-scale legislative bodies should
be treated differently in takings jurisprudence, because these differently scaled
legislatures are likely to behave differently in dealing with individuals' property
and to respond differently to compensation requirements. I agree with this general
proposition, but I sharply disagree with the centralist drift of most of this
literature, which favors the national legislature while imposing strict takings
requirements on local legislatures. I argue that these analyses overlook the existing
constraints on smaller-scale governing bodies.
Meanwhile, the courts have paid very little overt attention to federalism
concerns of any kind in takings jurisprudence, string citing cases about local,
state, and national governments without differentiating them. Instead of
responding to federalism (and other) takings theories, actual takings jurispru-
dence vacillates between leniency toward all legislatures and contempt for them.
I argue, however, that federalism considerations might help courts to analyze the
legislative process, and they might be incorporated into takings jurisprudence by a
distinction between Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment takings.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine for a moment the difference between your views on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and your local police department.
What do you think are the respective strengths and weaknesses of each? I
bet you would say that the FBI is probably good at high-tech forensic
investigations, complex financial crimes, and undercover work. Your local
police department might not be as good at those things, but I expect you
would say that it is likely good at cultivating local contacts, spotting street
comer bad guys, and helping out with Christmas charity programs. Now,
what failings would you expect at each level of policing? The FBI, you
might well say, is probably bad at noticing the nuances of local characters,
situations, and cultures, and its agents might behave imperiously and dismiss-
ively around state and local law officers-sometimes to their later chagrin, if
you have watched cop shows like NYPD Blue. But the local cops might also
have some systematic problematic areas. For example, they might get too
close to some locals, or they might get into a routine of treating certain
population groups as enemies, or they might put up a wall of silence about
the misbehavior of fellow officers.
Here is another set of situations to imagine: the differences between
local school board policies on, say, the school library, on the one hand, and
the federal testing requirements in the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),'
on the other. The local school board is likely to leave it to the school's
teachers and librarians to decide what will work as reading material for the
kids, but at the prodding of some especially outspoken local interest groups,
they might start to intervene and do a lot of ad hoc tailoring on the
sometimes contentious subject. That is to say, the local board might be
overresponsive in an uninformed way. NCLB has the advantage of requiring
each school to show its progress through nationally mandated testing. But
it has a quite different problem, at least according to its critics: It has a
blunderbuss, one-size-fits-all approach to education
Without pressing these hypothetical examples too far, it seems intuitive
that there are differences in these opposite-end levels of government in how
they operate and what we expect from them. Over a century ago,
1. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Nicole Liguor, Note, Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States That Don't Do
as We Say): Connecticut's Challenge to the Federal Government's Power to Control State Education
Policy Through the Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1049-53 (2006) (describing the criticisms
of NCLB's focus on testing, and Connecticut's disagreements with the federal government over
the types of testing deemed appropriate).
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Continental political theorists might have identified the divide between
them respectively as rationalism versus traditionalism,' or Gesellschaft
(society) versus Gemeinschaft (community),4 or for the Russians, modernist
Westernizers versus traditionalist Slavophiles.5 Governance on a larger
scale has necessitated modernist institutional rationalization, but on a
smaller scale, governmental institutions continue to hearken back to a more
hands-on and intimate style, with smaller councils, individualized decisions,
and more intense direct citizen involvement.6
One might expect, then, that differences like these might appear in
the literature about the ways in which governmental action is constrained
in American jurisprudence. Our jurisprudential constraints might have
something to do with the different competences and problem areas of
different levels of government. That is to say, we might expect judicial
constraints on governmental action to take account of what one could
roughly classify as federalism issues.
One category of those constraints is takings law, through which the
courts require governments to compensate property owners for various kinds
of losses occasioned by legislative action. And here indeed, a considerable
body of the theoretical literature of property takings fairly drips with
federalism-most of which, I should say, favors the modernist federal
government and disfavors the traditionalist local government, reflecting a
pattern that Robert Ellickson has described as the Beltway Syndrome.'
On the other hand, modem takings jurisprudence-court decisions as
distinguished from academic theory-blithely ignores any concerns at all
about the different competences of different kinds of legislatures. This is
3. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978) (differentiating
"rational" authority as based on formal rules, from "traditional" authority based on "immemorial
traditions," and describing "charismatic" authority stemming from exceptional personality).
4. FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIC SOCIETY (Jose Harris ed., Jose Harris
& Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1887).
5. See Laura Engelstein, Holy Russia in Modern Times: An Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural
Change, PAST & PRESENT, Nov. 2001, at 129, 142 (describing cultural opposition between
Westernizers and Slavophiles).
6. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and
the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1649-50 (2006) (describing how citizens participate
with greater ease in local rather than larger governments); see also Carol M. Rose, The Ancient
Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern
Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 94-99 (1989) (describing echoes of antifederalist, traditionalist
governmental concerns in modern local governmental structure).
7. Robert C. Ellickson, Panel I: Liberty, Property, and Environmental Ethics, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 397, 397 (1994) (describing the Beltway Syndrome as the "disease" that views only
the national government as significant).
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not to say that other kinds of federalism issues are absent from takings
jurisprudence. Since the landmark case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,8 the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the "background principles"
of state law determine the content of any given claim to property;9 and even
though the federal courts are now much more active in takings cases than
they once were, their decisions continue to leave the vast bulk of property
and land use supervision to the state courts.'0 But what is conspicuously
absent from federal takings jurisprudence is any discussion of the different
capabilities and problems of the different kinds of rulemaking bodies.
That lacuna is the subject of this Article-that is, what this aspect of
federalism tells us about takings jurisprudence. In brief, what federalism
tells us is that takings jurisprudence is not really about any of those fancy
theories of the ways that different kinds of legislative bodies behave. The
current trend in takings jurisprudence is just flat antilegislative, no matter
what the level, a sentiment that appears to be tempered only by the federal
courts' fear that if they become too activist, they will have to become grand
boards of appeal for every piece of legislation, no matter what its origin.
With that, let me review some of the major categories of modem
takings theories, to show how steeped they are-explicitly or implicitly-in
federalism concerns about legislative competence. Then I will briefly survey
some of the major modem takings cases, including those that especially
affect the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit, where one would suppose important federalism distinctions
might arise but in fact receive no attention whatever. In my view, this is a
jurisprudence that operates on no real theory of legislative or administrative
capabilities, and instead vacillates between letting legislatures do what they
like on the one hand, and disdainfully dismissing legislative action on the
other. At the moment, disdain has the momentum, but presumably that
too could shift in the future.
8. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
9. Id. at 1029 (rooting takings claims and defenses in "background principles" of state
property law); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004) (elaborating on the importance of state law background).
Stewart Sterk thinks legal scholars have ignored this state law background, id. at 211, although
there are certainly some who have discussed it, particularly since Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, see, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REV. 329, 347-51 (1995) (describing the actual South Carolina background property
principles at stake in Lucas); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310-11 (1993)
(commenting that one has to know existing state law to know when property is "taken").
10. Sterk, supra note 9, at 238-44.
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I. MODERN TAKINGS THEORIES: THE FEDERALISM DIMENSION
OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE
When does a regulation "take" property? That is one of the most
overwritten questions in American legal literature. I do not try to survey all
that literature here, but instead, I divide takings theories into two major
categories-fairness and efficiency-and discuss the work of just a few
leading proponents, especially the more recent ones. This is not to discount
all the other theories and the important nuances that their authors have
uncovered, but rather to yield to the fact that life is short. Fairness and
efficiency are broad terms, and I hope that many writers would agree that
these are the big categories for thinking about property takings.
Federalism is a major component in both categories, though not all
writers in either camp address federalism explicitly. But many do, and
with significant implications for the intensity of supervision that at least
theoretically should be exercised by the federal judiciary over different kinds
of legislatures. I should mention that I have been a severe critic of the
federalism aspects of some of these theories, but I do think they perform a
service in at least raising questions about the role of different kinds of
legislative competence in property jurisprudence. After all, as many writers
have noted, takings issues arise at points of transition," and particularly
at points of legislative change in light of such matters as new property uses
(such as skyscrapers), demographic shifts (such as beachfront congestion)
and new knowledge and technology (such as the invention of the automobile
and learning about air pollution damage). Takings jurisprudence is one way
to police the interactions between legislative change and the security of
individual ownership, and it should reflect some understanding of the ways
that different kinds of legislatures are likely to treat property issues.
Where, then, do these federalism concerns play out in the big catego-
ries of takings scholarship? Let us begin with fairness. The touchstone for
this scholarship is a remark in Armstrong v. United States 2: that no person
alone should be burdened with paying for benefits to the public, "which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'3
11. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 511 (1986) (citing regulatory transitions, including takings, as imposing losses); see also
Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT
GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49, 53-57 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds.,
1997) (discussing takings jurisprudence as one of several means for smoothing regulatory transitions).
12. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
13. Id. at 49.
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Fair enough, so to speak. But then, why would governments behave unfairly
to individuals? Why would legislatures gang up on some particular owner?
The answer to that question can quickly turn to the character of legisla-
tures, and from there the question can easily morph into an issue of
federalism. When this occurs, the usual answer lands particularly heavily
on local governments. Why? Because local legislative bodies are just not
federal enough; instead, they are too small, too un-Madisonian, too
premodern, too much based on cozy schmoozing instead of large-scale
legislative give and take.
Some version of this argument has undoubtedly been around a long time,
given a strain of mistrust of local governments in the later nineteenth century,14
but one can track it in more recent scholarship back to the mid-1960s. The
local government scholar Terrence Sandalow sketched out the argument in
an article in 1964,5 and the following year a Harvard Law Review note
developed it at much greater length. 6 As we shall see, the argument
continues to bob up, most recently in scholarship on regulatory takings. The
argument derives from Madison's famous analysis in The Federalist No. 10:
Legislatures drawn from small constituencies all too often divide into a
small number of factions, and of these, one or another is likely to dominate,
to the great disadvantage of its rival or rivals." Legislatures drawn from
large constituencies, on the other hand, have the advantage of incorporating
many different factions, so that all must horse-trade or logroll with the
others in order to arrive at a majority on any given issue. In this shifting,
large-scale legislative scene, no one faction can become the permanent
ruler, dominating the others over any length of time. Hence, according to
this classic argument, unlike the small-scale legislature, the large-scale
legislature has fewer occasions-not to speak of motivations-to fall into
the pit of factional oppression."8
14. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 88-89 (describing later
nineteenth century "Dillon's Rule," defining local governmental powers narrowly). But see
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 12-15 (1990) (cautioning against overstating state-level hostility to local government).
15. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 709-11 (1964).
16. Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (1965) [hereinafter
City Government]. A somewhat later version was Michael J. Waggoner, Log-Rolling and Judicial
Review, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 43 (1980).
17. City Government, supra note 16, at 1597-99.
18. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 853-57 (1983) (reviewing the Madisonian discussion of large-scale
legislature, implicit critique of local government).
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In turn, these two different scenarios have implications for fairness and
hence takings jurisprudence. As Frank Michelman pointed out in an
important and underappreciated article (not his extremely well-known 1967
Harvard article 9 but rather his Indiana piece written several years later"),
according to theories of this kind, the large Madisonian legislature, with all
its vote trading and logrolling, may result in some individual instances of
unequal treatment, but these disappear into a larger stack of legislative
decisions of which some take but others give. In local decisionmaking,
on the other hand, opportunities for logrolling and evening out may
never arise at all.' According to these antilocalists (of whom, I should say,
Michelman is not one), it is the smaller-scale legislative body-read, local
legislature-that can sink into the unfairness that comes from a single
dominating interest. As the Harvard note argued back in the mid-1960s, at
the local level, the dominating faction can become a permanent majority,
lording its power over opposing factions without bothering to trade votes
and stack goodies at all." That is why, in this literature, courts should take
particular note of unfairness at the local level.
There are more recent variants on this theme too, though their federalism
connotations are subtle. Dan Farber, for example, suggests that takings
jurisprudence should aim at providing compensation for those who cannot
easily make themselves heard, thus equalizing their situation with those
who can be heard and who can demand compensation (or who can prevent
programs ex ante). 3 But this too may be an implicit critique of local legislatures,
insofar as all viewpoints can get heard in the larger Madisonian legislature.
I have been a steady critic of this theory, because I think it very much
underestimates the endogenous fairness constraints on the local version of
government, constraints that I put under the rubric of "exit" and "voice." 4
19. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
20. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 172-73 (1977).
21. See id.
22. City Government, supra note 16, at 1597-99.
23. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279,
306-08 (1992).
24. Rose, supra note 18, at 882-87; Rose, supra note 6, at 98-102; Carol M. Rose, Takings,
Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-33 (1996) (book review); see also Vicki Been, "Exit"
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991); cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 833-34 (1992) (criticizing Vicki Been's thesis). For
a recent discussion of the exit constraint, see Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional
Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 767-68 (2007) (describing
exit as a brake on local land use exactions).
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However much Madisonian logrolling might establish what one might call
"legislative due process" in large-scale governments, smaller-scale govern-
ments have a legislative due process of their own, deriving from other
sources. For example, one can talk directly to local decisionmakers, show
up at the meetings, and in the worst-case scenarios, take one's marbles and
leave for a more accommodating town, in the standard model explicated in
Charles Tiebout's theory of local governmental competition.25 This is not
to say that exit and voice are perfect protections against local unfairness,
but only that at the local level, exit and voice circumscribe local govern-
mental unfairness more often than critics acknowledge. Nor is it to say that
small-scale legislatures have no weaknesses. They do, sometimes including
chumminess and lack of technical capacity. But large-scale legislatures
have their problems too, not the least of which is their tendency to enact
rigid or hypertechnical rules. In short, the strengths and weaknesses of these
different kinds of legislatures simply fall along different dimensions, and
require different kinds of monitoring, in takings jurisprudence as elsewhere.
I have obviously not been persuasive enough, however, because the
strikingly promodemist critique of local government has proved itself a
persistent weed. A notable example in the more recent past comes in
William Fischel's Regulatory Takings,26 in which the Madisonian critique forms
the foundation for the author's argument: Takings jurisprudence should
come down particularly hard on local governments, because these cozy little
Gemeinschafts need discipline in a way that the big modernist Gesellschaft
government does not.27
Fischel's concern was nominally not with fairness, however, but rather
with the other big branch of modem takings theory: efficiency. But then,
as Frank Michelman's famous Harvard article2" pointed out, fairness and
efficiency can overlap, and so I turn now to efficiency.
25. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418-20 (1956).
26. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995). William Fischel's discussion of the Madisonian thesis first appeared in William A. Fischel
& Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 115, 112-23 (1989).
27. FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 105-07.
28. Michelman, supra note 19.
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II. FROM FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY: A PARENTHESIS
ON THE MICHELMAN THESIS
Frank Michelman's much-cited 1967 article on takings jurisprudence
developed an efficiency thesis based on Jeremy Bentham's comments about
property, and on what one might call Bentham's economic psychology of
ownership.29 According to Bentham, property is no more than an expecta-
tion of security, but that expectation generates the willingness to work hard
and invest. The cumulative hard work and investment of many persons in
turn enriches a society as a whole. For that reason, when a government
violates an owner's expectations and takes away property, the owner suffers
a number of losses, but so does the society. The owner suffers the specific
loss of the property, of course, but she suffers more, too: She can also get
discouraged about making future efforts. What is more, the owner's
neighbors see what has happened to the particular owner, and they in turn
come to feel insecure, and they too curtail their efforts accordingly. The
result is what Bentham called the "deadening of industry,"" and the real
loser is the whole society.
Michelman borrowed the Benthamite analysis to point out that property
takings entail losses beyond those of the mere property itself, and he dubbed
those additional losses "demoralization costs."3' Then, in a much-cited tour
de force, Michelman created a "felicific calculus" of his own, where he
concluded that for efficiency purposes, property takings jurisprudence should
take demoralization costs into account, and more specifically, that owners
should be compensated when demoralization costs exceed "settlement
costs" (settlement costs being the expenditures that would be necessary to
overcome demoralization costs).
3 2
III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE MICHELMAN ANALYSIS:
INSURANCE AND INTERNALIZATION
One might wonder about several points in the Michelman analysis.
One question relates to owners: If owners might suffer so much from
takings of their property, why don't they get insurance? A second question
relates to governments: Given the long-term prospect of the "deadening
29. Id. at 1211-15; JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109-14 (C.K. Ogden
ed., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1789).
30. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 116.
31. Michelman, supra note 19, at 1214.
32. Id. at 1214-18.
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of industry" that results from demoralization costs, why do govern-
ments themselves not tote up the costs of property takings, especially
demoralization costs?
The first question, about insurance, came up in quite a lot of takings
theory in the 1980s, beginning with Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld's
assertion that the takings jurisprudence itself is the insurance: Takings compen-
sation acts as a kind of surrogate insurance in an area in which insurance
markets do not work well.33 Their thesis in turn generated more academic
back and forth about whether or not insurance would encourage
landowners to make overly risky investments.34
In still another turn, the insurance analysis led to the second question,
the one about governmental motivations. If owners need insurance against
legislative takings, then legislatures must not be taking owners' costs into
account. But why not? The answer is, because legislatures do not internalize
off-budget costs-not the elementary property-value losses that they should
be weighing against the benefits of the regulation itself (because owners'
losses are not in the governmental budget), and not those future
demoralization costs (because the legislatures that cause property takings do
not last long enough to take the long-term harms into account). This set of
inefficiencies leads to the next subject among takings theorists: how to get
governments to internalize externalities-a subject that once again leads
back to federalism questions about legislative competence, albeit through
the back door.
IV. EFFICIENCY REDUX: FORCING GOVERNMENTS
TO INTERNALIZE EXTERNALITIES
In some newer versions of efficiency analyses, scholars have called for
takings compensation as a way of requiring governments to take into
account the costs and benefits of their property-related decisions, thus
avoiding the "fiscal illusion" that comes when regulators are not confronted
directly with the costs of regulation.35 According to this line of thinking, as
33. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571-73 (1984). One reason is that governments control regulatory
decisions, creating a moral hazard problem. Id. at 593.
34. See Farber, supra note 23, at 283-88 (summarizing the insurance thesis and
scholarly critiques).
35. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 620-22 (using the term "fiscal illusion" to
describe the situation in which regulators underweigh off-budget costs to others); Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420
(1977) (describing the compensation requirement as leading to the weighing of costs and
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long as governments can make regulatory decisions that only affect other
people's property values, without an ostensible impact on the government's
budget, regulators are effectively spending other people's money. And that
means that they are likely to overestimate benefits, while they quite
insouciantly disregard regulatory costs. Moreover, they do not care about
future costs, including demoralization costs, because by the time those
come around to bite community productivity, the relevant political
decisionmakers will be out of office.
This looks like an argument that applies to legislatures at all levels, but
it does not take long to see that there is an important federalism issue
lurking here. Indeed, federalism issues have moved into the foreground
again, particularly in response to some of the criticisms generated by
these newer efficiency theories themselves. As some critics have noted,
takings compensation will hardly internalize externalities unless it actually
does catch the attention of the regulatory decisionmakers and induce
them to act more efficiently. 6 But do compensation cases have this effect
on decisionmakers? No, at least not at the federal level.37  Federal
agencies are huge and complex, and bureaucratic decisionmakers may
translate compensation requirements in ways that have little relationship
to efficiency.38 If compensation has quieted political opposition to, say, a
boondoggle canal, then federal agencies might spend even more on the ill-
conceived project. Legislators are even further removed from compensation
costs, given their ability to allocate and spread costs in such a way as to
defuse any significant constituent backlash.39 But local governments are
different, or so it is said. Fischel again is a central player here. In his 2001
book Homevoter Hypothesis (which he says he wrote in response to my
criticism that his earlier book, Regulatory Takings, consisted of a familiar
benefits); see also Farber, supra note 23, at 287-94 (summarizing the fiscal illusion argument for
compensation); Serkin, supra note 6, at 1634-37 (same); cf. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at
622-23 (partially rejecting the fiscal illusion argument for takings compensation). The phrase
"fiscal illusion" appears to come originally from public choice theory about taxation. See JAMES
M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 126-43 (1967) (using this phrase).
36. For a chief criticism of the cost-internalization thesis on takings compensation, see
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 375-77 (2000) (arguing that compensation may have
noninternalizing effects on legislatures). See also Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the
Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 248-57 (Gerald
Korngold & Andrew P. Morris eds., 2004) (sharply criticizing the cost-internalization thesis).
37. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1661-65.
38. Levinson, supra note 36, at 380-84.
39. Id. at 375-77; Serkin, supra note 6, at 1661-65.
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form of "localism bashing"'), he points out that he actually likes local
government. Not the least of his reasons is that, as he argues, the bulk of
local governments can indeed respond efficiently to issues pitting regulation
against property. Why? Because these governments are dominated by
"homevoters"-homeowners who take a very strong interest in property and
tax matters at the local level. These homevoters directly feel the impact of
local taxes that would be required for compensating property takings.
A recent article by Christopher Serkin has elaborated extensively on
the federalism implications of Fischel's homevoter thesis. Serkin agrees
with Fischel that local governments, the vast majority of which are small
enough to be ruled by sharp-eyed homevoters, are particularly good
candidates for compensation requirements.4' Why? Precisely because local
governments, unlike the big federal government, respond to the homevoters,
who both get the benefits of regulation and pay the taxes that pay for
compensation. Hence local legislatures will internalize externalities, at
least for the most part. But the other side of the coin is that the big fat U.S.
Congress will not, because it is so large that, as the standard public choice
analysis tells us, compensation payoffs to particular interests get spread
around diffuse interest groups without anyone noticing very much.42 And
federal bureaucracies will not internalize externalities either; their decisions
are even further removed from taxpayer preferences.43
Lee Fennell's fine book review of Fischel's Homevoter Hypothesis has
pointed out that the participants in local governments are not actually so
uniform as Fischel's homevoter analysis suggests, and that as a result, homevoter
decisions can have some serious distributional consequences. Tenants, for
example, do not necessarily share the interests of homevoters. 4 And one
might add, homevoters whose homes are on opposite sides of the railroad
tracks might not share interests either." No doubt more will come of all
this in the future.
40. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, at x (2001) (citing the "localism
bashing" criticism); Rose, supra note 24, at 131 (using the phrase "localism bashing").
41. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1644-47, 1659.
42. The locus classicus for this argument is JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) (arguing that large-scale democratic decisionmaking diffuses
the costs of logrolling groups' benefits).
43. Serkin, supra note 6, 1637-39, 1661-64 (describing the perverse public choice conse-
quences of compensation requirements in multiple-minority or "minoritarian" governments like
the U.S. Congress, greater appropriateness of compensation requirements for local governments).
44. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 628-30 (2002) (book review).
45. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring
the extension of paved streets and sewers to the minority areas of town).
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For now, this rather remarkable set of theories means that the focus of
takings jurisprudence should be local land use decisions, whether you hate
local government (because its self-serving, permanent dominating factions
will otherwise unfairly disregard minority interests), or love it (because it
responds to constituents who efficiently weigh regulatory compensation
costs against regulatory benefits). By contrast to local governments, on the
first, fairness-oriented theory, the federal government, with its big logrolling
legislature, does not need compensation to police property takings;
everything evens out in the vote trades that assure every interest a share in
the goodies. And on the second, efficiency-oriented theory, that kind of
policing would be pointless at the federal level anyway, because the federal
government's big legislature and big bureaucracy would not pay any atten-
tion to compensation requirements.
V. THE COURTS' RESPONSE-NOT!
As I mentioned earlier, I am not a fan of these theories that would
place local governmental actions squarely in the bull's-eye of takings
jurisprudence, because I think it is inaccurate to suppose that local govern-
ments lack alternative fairness and efficiency constraints. Nevertheless,
these theories do raise the very important issues of the ways that different
kinds of legislatures behave, and the different ways they may respond to
judicial supervision.
It would not be difficult for courts in takings cases to pay attention to
differences in legislative characteristics at different levels of government.
All that would be required doctrinally would be a pursuit of the differences
between Fifth Amendment takings (applying the takings clause directly to
the federal government) and Fourteenth Amendment takings (applying
takings analysis to states and localities through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment46). Undoubtedly, some fiddles would have to be made
to account for the state legislatures, which seem rather closer in size and
character to Congress than to the Hicksville Town Council, but the Fifth
Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment divide seems to be an easy and very
conventional starting point for the discussion.
How then have the courts reacted to these important federalism
questions of legislative competence in their takings jurisprudence, particularly
46. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-42 (1897) (first assertion that
a state or a local taking of property without compensation violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
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in view of the relatively easy doctrinal entry point? They haven't. Oh,
yes, in local government law, some state courts have pursued Madisonian
doubts by effectively denying that local legislatures really are legislatures for
some purposes, especially when they make small-scale land use decisions.
These decisions then require local legislatures to jump through some extra
decisionmaking hoops based on judicial process." These requirements, in
my view, fit only very awkwardly with the actual processes of fair local
decisionmaking. s But in takings cases, the courts have not even bothered
to give these federalism concerns the back of their hand.
Consider the defendants in the major takings cases that the Supreme
Court has deemed worthy of consideration since the 1970s, when the Court
started to take a serious interest in the subject after a fifty-year pause. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York49 and Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.'O took up two different municipal regulations from
New York City, upholding the first and overturning the second; Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission"1 held against a state body, the California
Coastal Commission, and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 against
the equivalent council in South Carolina; 3 Palazollo v. Rhode Island 4 gave a
mixed result to the state coastal board of Rhode Island; Hodel v. Irving"
invalidated a federal statute concerning Indian lands as a taking of property;
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel overturned another federal statute (though not
entirely on takings grounds) that attempted to require firms to contribute
retrospectively to an employee health fund; and Yee v. City of Escondido"2
47. See, e.g., Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (early and
leading case treating small-scale land use decisions as "quasi-judicial" rather than legislative).
48. Rose, supra note 18, at 867-82 (critical appraisal of quasi-judicialization); Carol M.
Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1155, 1162-64 (1984) (noting
some of the difficulties of applying quasi-judicial category).
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
51. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
52. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
53. Justice White momentarily mistook South Carolina for California. See Richard J.
Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1417-18 (1993) (recounting
the incident).
54. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
55. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). The property in question was a set of fractional shares of individ-
ual Indian land allotments, which Congress hoped to consolidate and turn over to the reservations.
56. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Justice Kennedy concurred with four other Justices in overturning
the statute, but he did not agree that a taking was involved because he did not think that the
firm had a property interest at stake. Id. at 539-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion
of the case, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property , 86 VA. L. REv.
885, 900-07 (2000).
57. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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and Dolan v. City of Tigard8 respectively upheld and upended regulations
from Escondido, California, and Tigard, Oregon, both suburban communities.
Of the governmental entities in these cases, only Escondido and
Tigard were possibly homevoter communities, or conceivably the kinds of
towns that might be dominated by permanent factions, though that too is
somewhat doubtful. Did the Court make anything of the possible differences
between federal, state, and local decisionmaking? Not really; all these
opinions cited one another and included string cites of cases about
legislatures at all different levels, without acknowledging the potential
differences in legislative decisionmaking. Meanwhile, over in another
federal courthouse, the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
have been busily applying the Supreme Court's takings categories to the
federal government's wetlands and endangered species measures, as well as
to a number of other federal entitlement and regulatory measures (such as
housing subsidy programs and patents). Although the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit deny quite a number of claims for
compensation, they occasionally apply the Supreme Court's ordinary
takings criteria to these federal defendants, if anything more stringently
than the Supreme Court does to state and local defendants.59 But the
Federal Circuit also string cites Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment cases without distinction, as if in takings cases, all kinds of
legislatures were the same.'
If at least some modem takings theories implicate federalism in the
sense of legislative competence, and if the Supreme Court and other federal
courts' actual takings cases ignore these kinds of federalism issues, what does
it tell us about the our highest court's takings jurisprudence? Well, one
thing is for sure: That jurisprudence is not concerned with modem takings
theories, or at least not the legislative competence aspect of those theories.
The next question is, why not? After all, takings jurisprudence polices
the boundaries between security of private property and legislative action,
58. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
59. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(upholding a takings claim for the denial of a wetlands permit on a portion of the original parcel);
Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (holding that a partial
diminution in value may be a taking). For a critical discussion of both cases, see Michael C.
Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation
Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171 (1995). Michael Blumm also notes the conven-
tional theoretical anomaly of holding federal legislation to a higher standard than state and local
legislation. Id. at 173; see also David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 828-31 (1999) (noting government success in
the great majority of claims even after Lucas, but with some controversial exceptions).
60. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1175-79; Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570-72.
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and one would think that adjudicators would be interested in the character-
istics of the legislative bodies in question. There are several possible answers,
but one is this: It is just too damned much trouble to sort out takings issues
by governmental levels. There is probably something to this answer.
Christopher Serkin's extensive and thought-provoking recent foray into
intergovernmental takings distinctions gives an idea of the complications.6
Roughly pursuing William Fischel's homevoter thesis, Serkin's approach
would charge homevoter local governments with compensation for property
takings in order to induce these governments to internalize externalities.62
But his plan would also entail some adjustments to counteract homevoters'
risk aversion (because of their big investments in their houses), as well as
intergovernmental externalities (because other town boundaries are likely
to be close by).63 One can easily imagine that courts might react adversely
to all that tinkering. It is just too fancy.
But a more plausible answer is that the Court's takings jurisprudence is
not based on any particular theory of the ways that legislatures might act
unfairly or inefficiently. Instead, that jurisprudence is reacting to a rising
distrust of governmental initiatives, no matter what the level of govern-
ment or type of legislative body from which they emerge.6  Legal
scholarship has played some role in this development. Probably the single
most influential academic work in the takings literature in the last
generation is Richard Epstein's 1985 book Takings,65 which has been an
enormous source of encouragement to antigovernmental litigators and
think tanks. This book mixed together a version of constitutional originalism
with efficiency considerations and libertarian proclivities, and because of its
somewhat undigested polymorphism, it took a beating in the legal academic
reviews. 6 But it nevertheless has had a huge following, because it has
61. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1680-97. Serkin explores local land use procedures further in
Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=949390 (elaborating on
mechanisms to allow localities to precommit to varying levels of property protection).
62. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1680-97.
63. Id.
64. For a similar conclusion with respect to the recent wave of legislative restraints on the
use of eminent domain, see Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New
London, Sweet Home v. Babbitt, and Other Tales From the Supreme Court 51, 60 (U. of Houston
L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2006-W-02, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=895008
(describing restraints as an example of the "Constitution in Exile" movement, or, more
specifically, "minimalism").
65. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
66. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21(1986)
(book review) (sharply criticizing Epstein's book); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An
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something for everyone who dislikes governmental regulation. One of the
most thoughtful and sympathetic academic reviews at the time was Thomas
Merrill's, which pointed out that the underlying thread holding Epstein's
book together is disdain for the political branches of government, as opposed
to the judiciary; Epstein thinks the former are particularly vulnerable to
"rent seeking," the angling of small groups to get control of the property
that justly belongs to others.6"
That same disdain for political decisionmaking runs through many
recent proposals for takings compensation. It is quite in keeping with this
strand of thinking that the author of the first major regulatory takings case,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6" was Oliver Wendell Holmes, a man who
deferred to legislatures but with notorious contempt.6 9 In more recent years,
the Reagan Administration's Executive Order 126300 pounced on several
then-recent Supreme Court takings cases and required federal agencies to
analyze proposed regulations for their takings implications. But given
that takings analyses since Mahon have had an ad hoc character, and
given that the Supreme Court itself has said takings issues necessitate
case-by-case analyses," and given, finally, that federal regulations reach such
a wide range of properties, Executive Order 12630 gave agencies an
impossible task. It is hard enough to figure out what a taking is after the
fact, on a case-by-case basis. Before the fact, with a large but amorphous set
of potentially affected properties, assessment is well-nigh impossible. Hence
one could characterize the Executive Order as a measure to harass and
impede regulation, rather than one that protects individuals' property or
induces a weighing of costs and benefits.
Similarly, Howard Rich, the wealthy eminence grise behind several
state-level takings initiatives, has stated flatly that his goal is to impede
governmental regulation. 2 If recent history is a guide, those initiatives may
indeed succeed in stymying regulation. In Oregon, voters a few years ago
Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829 (1986) (book review) (same); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1986) (book review) (same).
67. Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
1561, 1586-90 (1986) (book review).
68. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
69. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY
OF JUSTICE HOLMES 62-63 (2000) (arguing that Holmes deferred to legislatures out of social
Darwinism and cynicism).
70. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989).
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
72. Christopher Cooper, How Mr. Rich Spreads the Republican Word, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7,
2006, at A4.
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passed Measure 37, - which required either compensation or repeal when
new regulations simply diminish property values. Since then, however,
property owners' challenges have virtually all led to repeal rather than
compensation. Indeed, in one of the very few compensation proffers under
Measure 37, the landowners have attempted to reject compensation; they
did not want the regulation at all.7' A backlash may be on the way, however,
because many property owners do want regulation. They want it because
regulation generally protects property, a point that, for the most part, is
conveniently ignored by property rights proponents. 5 Citing a particularly
notable instance in which some Oregon landowners claimed the right to
start a quarry next to other people's property, some citizens in other states
cite Oregon's experience as a warning, and apparently even Oregonians
themselves would reject the measure if it were to arise today. 6
Visceral dislike of legislative actions may drive takings proposals and
many takings cases, but there is at least one countervailing deterrent on
courts generally, and on the Supreme Court in particular. One reason not
to extend takings jurisprudence too far is that the regulatory takings
doctrine is at bottom an unfathomable well of antilegislative activism, at all
levels. Every regulation has some winners and some losers, and to allow
takings challenges to all of them in effect would turn the Takings Clause
into an avenue for general taxpayer suits against governments, including
the federal government. I keep a file that I call "weird takings claims," and
the materials in that file suggest how ready lawyers are to let takings claims
spill out from land-based matters, their historical locus, into every kind of
regulation that governments pass-nowhere more so than in the courts
dealing with federal claims.7 7  And even sticking to the garden-variety
takings claims about local land regulations, municipal officials have the
73. State Measure No. 37 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005)).
74. Matthew Preusch, Prineville Offers Measure 37 Pay, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 26,
2006, at Al (describing only one payment offer to date, which was rejected by the owners).
75. See, e.g., Debate, Taking "Takings Rights" Seriously: A Debate on Property Rights
Legislation Before the 104th Congress, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 253, 259 (1995) (statement of Kenneth
B. Mehlman) (calling for compensation for wetlands regulation); cf. id. at 263-64 (statement of
Joseph L. Sax) (arguing that concern for community needs is inherent in property rights).
76. Editorial, Oregon's Sad Tale a Warning for Voters, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 3,
2006, at 18A.
77. See, e.g., Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the claim that FAA regulations preventing the use of a heliport pad after 9/11 was a
taking); Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim that pay at
an allegedly erroneous overtime rate was a taking); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379
F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim that the revocation of permits to fish for
herring and mackerel in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone was a taking).
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perfect revenge for a know-it-all Supreme Court: They will let the Court
turn itself it into a Universal Board of Zoning Appeals. The Supreme
Court has recoiled from this prospect, using the device of referring claims to
state remedies, 78 and avoiding general cost-benefit review of regulations.'
Disdain for legislative bodies has its limits too. If you show too much
disdain, you will wind up doing their job, and so far, the Supreme Court
does not want to become a Universal Board of Zoning Appeals.
Is there a way that courts might structure takings decisions to account
more fully for intergovernmental differences, as well as for issues of owner
security, in different legislative contexts? Possibly. As I mentioned earlier,
one doctrinal route is available through a distinction between the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, though it would engage the courts in substantive
due process considerations, and some members of the Supreme Court do
not want to get into this. 0 One does not need to give in to localism
bashing to acknowledge that local governments are very likely to deal with
property issues differently from the way that the federal government does,
in much the same way that local cops deal with issues differently from the
FBI, or the local school board regulations differ from the No Child Left
Behind Act.
With federal regulation, the most serious fairness and efficiency issues
are likely to stem from the cookie-cutter problem, the one-size-fits-all
inflexibility about local circumstances that lead not only to outrage but also
78. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) (declining to consider the case on ripeness grounds); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise
of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 253-54 (2006) (arguing that a recent
U.S. Supreme Court case combines ripeness and preclusion in such a way as to delegate takings
cases to state courts).
79. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005) (declining to consider an
action a taking on the ground that it did not substantially advance a state purpose); see J. Peter
Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34 ECOL. L.Q. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976404 (arguing that Lingle shows federal courts' distaste for open-ended
due process review of land use regulations, but that state courts are better equipped to scrutinize
these regulations for due process and are likely to continue to do so).
80. See Merrill, supra note 56, at 987 (noting Justice Scalia's rejection of substantive due
process in any form); id. at 983-85 (discussing some potential differences between takings and due
process analysis of property-related issues, though not linking them to differences between fed-
eral, state, and local regulation). Until its approach was rejected by the Supreme Court, the New
York Court of Appeals treated regulatory impacts on property as issues of due process, except
when the regulation actually took title or physical control of an owner's property. See Fred
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-86 (N.Y. 1976) (distinguishing a
regulation taking title or transferring control to the government from an unreasonable use
of police power); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274
(N.Y. 1977) (same); cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122, n.25
(1978) (affirming the New York Court of Appeals decision but stating that property may be taken
by acts other than transfer of control).
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to evasion. But this kind of problem may be alleviated by opportunities for
tradeoffs elsewhere in a whole array of Congressional legislation, or by a more
hands-on administration of the legislation in question. These are issues that
courts could ask about with respect to takings challenges to federal
property-related legislation. On this approach, for example, one might
well understand why the Court in Hodel v. Irving' found that congressional
legislation took property when it attempted to consolidate fractionated
Indian allotments; however unwieldy the fractionated holdings, removing
them without compensation looked high-handed and inattentive to highly
personal and emotional stakes of relatively uninfluential people.r2 On the
other hand, with respect to the land-related wetlands and endangered
species takings challenges that are bound to emerge on the Court's docket
one of these days, one would want to know whether the legislation was
implemented in a one-size-fits-all manner, or whether individual landowners
had opportunities to come to reasonable accommodations, perhaps through
wetlands trades or habitat protection plans.83
When the regulatory body is local, however, one might want to ask
about the more local version of what one might dub "legislative due
process"-not the Madisonian tradeoffs but rather the possibilities for voice
and exit that are more salient locally. One would want to know whether
the property owner has a voice, in the sense that she gets or could get the
ear of the local governing body. Alternatively, one would want to know
whether she has been effectively shut out, as some minority groups have
been in the past, and as nonresident owners might still be, when local
governments try especially hard to protect insiders' property values and tax
bills. One would also want to know whether the complaining landowner
had an opportunity for exit or for what one might call "anticipatory exit,"
by staying out of a known local regulatory climate and by making some
other Tieboutian choice that would bring home to the local legislature
itself the costs of oppressive legislation.
One should also take into account that in the local context, the federal
judiciary is not the only safeguard against arbitrariness. Stewart Sterk has
stressed the importance of state court review on state and local measures,
81. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
82. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (exploring the theme of property made unusable
by the fractionation of interests).
83. These mitigation efforts may of course raise other issues. See James Salzman & J.B.
Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611-12
(2000) (noting questions about the fungibility of habitat and wetlands trades).
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but there are other constraints as well. 4 State planning legislation makes
many demands on local governments to rationalize their procedures and to
take their share of unwanted uses, and it may also require them to explain
what they are doing in various ways.8' State requirements for impact review,
for example, may create a lot of opportunities for venting, delay, and
excessive verbiage. But those state demands do require local regulators to
explain their actions, and if one is concerned about clubbiness in local
government, the demand for an explanation can be half the battle.86
CONCLUSION
Federal takings supervision of local and state governments began as a
due process matter. But as many modem takings theorists have noted, federal
and local legislative processes differ. The usual modernist approach among
legal academics is to deride local governments, because they do not replicate
the federal legislative process. In my view, that is a mistake; local legislatures
have a kind of legislative due process of their own, though it is not the
same as the large legislature's horse-trade among interest groups. But as
contemporary takings theorists regularly note, the property owner is not the
only entity at stake. Governments are on the other side of the equation,
and different levels of government are apt to have their own characteristic
strengths, as well as their characteristic weaknesses. Those too are a part of
the inquiry into a jurisprudence that should assure fairness, provide for the
satisfaction of normal though regularly changing expectations about govern-
mental action, and permit governments to do the work that citizens expect
them to do. Do we see those federalism concerns in contemporary takings
decisions? No, and that fact tells us that the courts are not paying much
attention to competence-based takings theory. But if judicial takings
decisions ever do develop a coherent theory, those issues should come to
the fore. That is because a genuine takings theory is also a theory of
governance, something sorely lacking in our current takings jurisprudence.
84. Sterk, supra note 9, at 261-70; see also Byrne, supra note 79 (noting state courts' due
process review of land regulations).
85. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-461.05 (West 1996) (describing the required elements in
municipal plans, including land use, water use, circulation, public services, conservation, and housing).
86. See, e.g., New York Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2005); see also Fenster, supra note 24, at 759-64 (describing further
state legislative and judicial constraints on local land use exactions).
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